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ABSTRACT: 
The North American public sphere is suffused with claims and counterclaims about the 
relationship between Islam and violence. Schools and publishers have responded with training 
programs for teachers and curriculum units for students introducing them to the Middle East 
and its dominant religious tradition. Such programs are often accused by local parents and 
national intellectuals of pandering to Muslim sensitivities by whitewashing distasteful historical 
events and even proselytizing young people. Focusing on a 2002 lawsuit filed against 
California’s Byron Union School District, by parents upset by a classroom role-playing exercise 
on Islam, this article argues that political fears about terrorist infiltration into U.S. society are 
building on powerful emotional and cultural concerns about the nature of ritual and the 
spiritual safety of children exposed to information about other religions. By encouraging public 
education as a response to political and cultural tensions, educators may in fact be heightening 
the public’s concerns about Islam as a comprehensive threat. 
 
The first trick-or-treater arrived at my front door promptly at 6 p.m. A boy about 7 or 8 
years old, he was wearing a white turban, white slacks, a long white jacket [and] a 
rubber-like mask of Osama bin Laden. In one hand he carried his treat bag, in the other 
a toy replica of an M-16. . . .I’m still outraged that any company in this country would 
sell a Bin Laden mask and that any parent, perhaps one of my neighbors, would 
purchase it for a child’s costume (A 2 November 2006 letter to the Charlotte Observer). 
 
*T+he point is that between. . .the ‘thin description’ of what the rehearser (parodist, 
winker, twitcher. . .) is doing (‘rapidly contracting his right eyelids”) and the ‘thick 
description’ of what he is doing (‘practicing a burlesque of a friend faking a wink to 
deceive an innocent into thinking a conspiracy is in motion’) lies the object of 
ethnography: a stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures in terms of which twitches, 
winks, fake-winks, parodies, rehearsals of parodies are produced, perceived and 
interpreted, and without which they would not. . .in fact exist, no matter what anyone 
did or didn’t do with his eyelids (Geertz 1973:7). 
 
 
Islam is a problem. It is held responsible for terrorism, the oppression of women, economic 
underdevelopment, repressive political systems, and a host of other difficulties around the 
world. Islam and modernity, Islam and progress, Islam and liberalism appear, in the minds of 
many, to be perennially at odds, perhaps irreconcilable. Over the last few years European and 
American governments and foundations have begun to explore increased funding for scholarly 
work on Muslim populations in their countries, framing such projects, at least implicitly, as the 
study of a social problem. How have, and how will, Muslim populations adapt, assimilate, resist, 
and reform themselves in non-Muslim environments? Where do they live, and what are their 
demographics? Are they similar to previous waves of immigrants, or qualitatively different?  
How can we help ensure they  will not become a danger to their host societies? And at the most 
basic level, who counts as “Muslim” (is it a matter of belief, mosque attendance, identification, 
or descent) in the first place (Leonard 2003)? 
Contemporary social theory often defines modernity as a set of techniques for 
generating particular kinds of intellectual, social, and political order, or even the phenomenon 
of order itself (Bauman 1990, Foucault 1977, Latour 1993, Mitchell 1988, 2002). Such 
arguments often revolve around the nation-state as the source and product of an 
unprecedented type of social and experiential ordering. Arjun Appadurai (2006) has recently 
extended this literature by examining the intersection of nation-state politics and globalization, 
looking at the fear national majority populations often feel about small minority groups. Like 
Bauman (1990), who traced this fear to the politically productive intellectual ambivalence 
created by the social category of “stranger,” Appadurai writes that by spoiling the fantasy of 
categorical purity within the modern nation-state, the existence of quantifiable minorities can 
act as a focus for violent reaction, especially when those internal minorities are linked with 
global populations beyond one’s borders. “Given the systemic compromise of national 
economic sovereignty that is built into the logic of globalization,” he writes, 
 
and given the increasing strain this puts on states to behave as trustees of the interests 
of a territorially defined and confined “people,” minorities are the major site for 
displacing the anxieties of many states about their own minority or marginality (real or 
imagined) in a world of a few megastates, of unruly economic flows and compromised 
sovereignties. Minorities, in a word, are metaphors and reminders of the betrayal of the 
classical national project (Appadurai 2006:43). 
 
When we think about Islam, politics, and modernity, it is insufficient, then, to restrict 
our attention to obvious cases of “Muslim politics” in the majority Muslim world (Eickelman 
and Piscatori 1996), or to the politics of “real” or even virtual Muslim populations elsewhere. As 
a “networked civilization” (Gilmartin 2005), a religious tradition, an act of faith, and a globalized 
symbol evoking emotions ranging from admiration and desire to dismissal, hostility and fear, 
Islam and Muslims are objects of imagination, and this imagination has implications for politics 
and for experiences of the modern by non-Muslims, even in places where Muslims are nearly 
absent. 
This article examines some current controversies regarding teaching and learning about 
Islam in American public schools, in order to illuminate how Islam as an object of imagination 
can shape the experience of modernity. Focusing on the federal court case of Eklund v Byron 
Union School District (2002), in which a California family claimed its children’s public school was 
coercing them into Islam, I will describe how parental and community concerns about such 
teaching have entered the media and the judicial system, and the ways that schools, courts, 
and activists of various sorts have expressed their understandings of the relationship between 
knowledge, ritual, and personal commitment.   
Appadurai’s outline of a “geography of anger” posits majority fears of a “volatile 
morphing” in which majority and minority might switch places, and the preventive generation 
of “predatory identities” which seek to destroy the cultural “other” before “brute accelerated 
reproduction or subtler legal or political means” on the part of the minority cause such an 
inversion to happen (2006:51, 85). Given this sense of worry, the invisible boundary between 
Muslim and non-Muslim status becomes an important line of demarcation, and activities 
normally interpreted as imagination, play, or culturally sanctioned rituals of reversal such as 
Halloween or schoolroom make-believe, lose their normal meaning and come to be perceived 
as potentially earnest expressions of self. In Geertz’s idiom, the presumption of a common 
cultural framework allowing us to distinguish between twitches and winks fails. Becoming or 
impersonating a Muslim, notorious or not, or engaging in what seems stereotypical Muslim-like 
behavior even with “secular” or consciously parodic purpose, is sometimes interpreted either 
as crossing a dangerous cultural border or as a psychological prelude to doing so.   
In the court case I analyze here, parents were concerned that children were being 
proselytized or being made to impersonate Muslims in public school. But as Sullivan (1994, 
2005) has shown, judicial and popular understandings of ritual more broadly speak past each 
other.  American courts generally distinguish quite finely between winks and twitches, 
perceiving secular purposes and effects beneath forms of action and thought which religious 
activists define much more specifically as sacred. Portions of the religious public, on the other 
hand, see pedagogical techniques and programs developed by Christian multiculturalists–
meant to teach the values of tolerance and diversity in American society--as attempts by 
aggressive groups of Islamic militants to highjack schools as platforms for turning the United 
States into an Islamic nation. The messy politics of modernity, postmodernity, and globalization 
are clearly not restricted to Muslim societies. 
 
 
Brazen Influence 
 
Islamist Lawfare is often predatory, filed without a serious expectation of winning, and 
undertaken as a means to intimidate, demoralize and bankrupt defendants (Goldstein 
2008). 
 
[The development of predatory identities includes] a successful campaign of fear, 
directed at numerical majorities, which convinces them that they are at risk of 
destruction by minorities, who know how to use the law (and the entire apparatus of 
liberal-democratic politics) to advance their special ends (Appadurai 2006:58). 
 
Harvard-trained medieval historian Daniel Pipes has made his reputation combating “radical 
Islam” through his websites, in newspapers, and on television appearances. The intensity of his 
defense of “the West” derives perhaps from the fact that he is in agreement with terrorist 
mastermind Osama bin Laden with regard to the success such radical Islam enjoys on the world 
stage. At a late 2001 meeting with supporters in Qandahar, Bin Laden spoke about mass 
conversions to Islam in Holland and the increase in American interest in Islam resulting from 
the September 11th attacks: “I heard someone on Islamic radio who owns a school in America 
say: ‘We don't have time to keep up with the demands of those who are asking about Islamic 
books to learn about Islam.’ This event made people think (about true Islam) which benefitted 
Islam greatly.”1 The idea that a cascade of nonbelievers is likely to convert voluntarily after 
Muslim military victories recalls contemporary Middle Eastern portrayals of the Prophet 
Muhammad’s victory over the pagan Quraysh at the battle of Badr, after which “the fence-
sitters and fearful among the [pagan tribe of the] Quraysh. . . enter[ed] Islam in droves" (al-
Duwwa et.al. 1988:82), inspired either by feelings of awe at the divinely guided victory or by 
fear of the victors. 
 Pipes, too, sees Islam making strides in the United States. For him, this is not because of 
true popular interest, but because of a concerted effort by what he terms “militant Islamic 
groups” to coopt popular culture and academia with the goal of turning the U.S. into an Islamic 
nation. “More ominously yet,” he wrote in right-wing activist David Horowitz’s online journal 
FrontPageMagazine, “they wish to transform public schools at all levels into venues for 
spreading Islam” (Pipes 2004). “Schools and campuses are no exceptions as places where Islam 
can be victorious,” Pipes quotes the Muslim website DawaNet.com as evidence for this fear; 
“We should use every opportunity to sensitize non-Muslim peers and school staff to Islam and 
to establish an environment in which everywhere a non-Muslim turns, he notices Islam 
portrayed in a positive way, is influenced by it and eventually accepts Islam” (Pipes 2004). 
One of the ways such an environment is created is through the actions of local schools 
and school boards, state departments of education, and commercial textbook publishers. Each 
of these bodies, according to Pipes and his readers, is subject to pressure from “a highly 
successful insidious industry that is extremely well organized, well connected, legally savvy, 
brazenly influential, and without successful opposition” (White 2005). Examples of Islamic 
proselytization have multiplied in the blogosphere through the testimony of parents being 
picked up by various media. In Tulsa, Oklahoma, parents met in a church to oppose a workshop 
for public school teachers on “The Arab World and Islam” (KOTV 2004). In Middletown, Ohio, 
seventh-grade social studies teachers cancelled a class trip to a Cincinnati mosque over 
parental fears that “the students would be asked to engage in Muslim rituals while at the 
mosque,” according to school officials (Kershaw-Staley 2004). In Scottsdale, Arizona, a seventh 
grade world history text was criticized for pro-Islamic bias, and parents complained that their 
children were forced to write biographies of Muhammad and listen to “professional Muslim 
speakers” who “brought prayer rugs and taught the children to pray the Muslim way.  I also 
believe there were recitations from the Koran and possibly an Islamic ‘fashion show’,” (White 
2005). An unnamed parent alleged that shortly after September 11th, children at the local 
school “were asked to get on their hands and knees and pray to Allah with the words of Islam 
*sic+ prayer” (www.blessedcause.org).  The folkloric dynamism of these charges as they zoom 
about the internet, surfacing here and there on conservative websites and blogs, transforms  
news into archetype and confused hearsay about schoolroom experiences--mixed with heavy 
doses of parental suspicion and anxiety--into news. One popular narrative quotes a 2002 
Kansas City Star report on Muslim third, fourth, and fifth grade children from a private Islamic 
school in Herndon, VA, touring local public schools to demonstrate Muslim crafts and ritual. The 
story quickly morphed into accusations that a Muslim diversity consultant touring public 
schools directed young non-Muslim students in performing Muslim prayer, seemingly 
confirming parental fears that Islam can only be “presented”  performatively, through its 
instantiation in new Muslims. 
 Probably the most talked-about cases among parents and activists are those involving a 
particular 7th grade social studies textbook, Houghton-Mifflin’s Across the Centuries, and a 
supplementary curriculum unit called Islam: A Simulation of Islamic History and Culture, 610-
1100. Both were criticized by Pipes in columns in the New York Post, the Jerusalem Post, and on 
his blog. Across the Centuries was criticized for its allegedly apologetic tone and factual 
distortion,  its inclusion of classroom activities meant to identify students with Muslims 
(“Assume you are a Muslim soldier on your way to conquer Syria in the year A.D. 635.  Write 
three journal entries that reveal your thoughts about Islam, fighting in battle, or life in the 
desert,”), and for allegedly failing to distinguish between Muslim belief and historical fact. 
 The other curriculum unit, Islam: a Simulation, was even more problematic.  It outlined 
a three-week curriculum in which  
 
students adopt a Muslim name (‘Abdalla,’ ‘Karima,’ etc.).  It has them wear Islamic 
clothing: for girls this means a long sleeved dress and the head covered by a scarf.  
Students unwilling to wear Islamic clothes must sit mutely in the back of the class, 
seemingly punished for remaining Westerners. [The publisher] calls for many Islamic 
activities: taking off shoes, washing hands, sitting on prayer rugs, and practicing Arabic 
calligraphy. Students study the Koran, recite from it, design a title page for it, and write 
verses of it on a banner. They act out Islam’s Five Pillars of Faith, including giving zakat 
(Islamic alms) and go on the pilgrimage to Mecca (Pipes 2002). 
 
 Islam: A Simulation was written by Terry Handy, a veteran middle school social studies 
teacher in Pismo Beach, California, and published in 1991 by Interaction Publishers of Carlsbad, 
California, which specialized in simulation exercises for schools. It was listed by the California 
Department of Education as a supplemental curriculum unit eligible for adoption in California 
schools, which, like most of the other 50 states, has adopted social studies standards requiring 
students to learn about Islam, its prophet, and the everyday significance of its texts and beliefs 
(California School Boards Association 2004). In late June 2002 The Thomas More Law Center, a 
conservative Catholic legal foundation, filed a lawsuit on behalf of Jonas Eklund in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California to prevent the Byron Union School District 
from using the simulation (Eklund’s son Chase had taken part in the simulation during the fall of 
2001 and his younger child, Samantha, was excused at her parents’ request from participation 
the following year). The court granted a decision in this case to the school district on 5 
December 2003. The Eklunds appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which agreed with 
the lower court’s decision on 17 November 2005. On 2 October 2006 the Supreme Court 
declined to hear the case during its current session, but certified the American Catholic Lawyers 
Association to file a brief as amicus curiae (“friend of the court,” a legal analysis submitted by 
an individual or institution who is not a direct party to a court case), as the Mountain States 
Legal Foundation had done in July 2006.  
 
  
 
“Try to Teach the Subject in a Non-threatening, Secular Way” 
 
 Islam: A Simulation is contained in a 116-page packet outlining 5 phases of a three-week 
class simulation. It is designed so teachers can customize the unit, choosing one or more 
elements to use in class. On the introductory day students take a pre-test, learn about Muslim 
dress, customs, and history, and break into six “city groups,” representing Cairo, Jerusalem, 
Medina, Damascus, Baghdad, and Cordova. Each city group has a caliph, a banker, a secretary, 
and a number of citizens who, on the subsequent days, compete in exercises labeled “Caravan 
Days,” “Oasis Days,” and “Festival Days.” During Caravan Days cities compete to answer 
questions on Quiz cards, collect Wisdom cards and dirham scrip, and survive life events (“You 
failed to offer refreshments to your guest. Lose 1 dirham.” “While on your last caravan, your 
herd increased by three camels, five goats, and 12 sheep. Gain 15 dirhams”). During Oasis Days, 
students learn more about Islamic beliefs, practices, and history, doing simulated activities and 
role-playing historical caliphs. The simulation builds to Festival Days, during which each city 
presents a project (art, food, music, or a more traditional presentation about Islam), and ends 
with the Islamic Bowl, a contest in which each qualifying city chooses contestants for a game 
testing Islamic knowledge.   
 According to court records, Chase Eklund’s teacher had her students choose Arabic 
names, and then focused on the “Oasis Days” elements of the simulation, including having the 
city groups engage in activities “analogous to” the five pillars of Islam. The children heard 
prayers and portions of the Qur’an read aloud in class, recited a line from prayer (e.g. the 
basmallah, “In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate”) on their way out of class, 
and made group banners featuring the basmallah (in Arabic script or in English translation) as 
analogues to the shahada, the Muslim declaration of faith, and salat, prayer. Students gave up 
eating candy or watching television for a day, and did community service projects as analogues 
to the Ramadan fast and the payment of zakat, or alms. As an analog to the pilgrimage,  
competed in a board game called “Race to Makkah,” moving markers around a game board 
while answering questions about Islam. The simulation’s general instructions to classroom 
teachers reminds them of the sensitivities potentially arising from the exercise, and advise 
them to teach in a “nonthreatening, secular way,” framing the simulation as a historical and 
cultural activity rather than a ritual or religious one. 
 
Ritual Arbitration  
 
Students should comprehend the religious ideas that have helped to shape Western and 
Eastern cultures and civilizations; they should become aware of the influence of religion 
on lifestyles. . .and on the development of ideas. The teacher should assist students to 
understand religious views that can be quite unfamiliar in the United States. Care should 
be taken, however, to avoid emphasizing unusual religions or religious practices so that 
respect for religion will not be undermined (California Department of Education 1994, 
quoted in CSBA 2002:21). 
 
 The case of Eklund v. Byron Union School District hinges on the special nature of role-
playing exercises and whether they are similar enough to religious ritual to trigger a valid claim 
that the public school is violating the Constitution. The United States Constitution contains two 
directives regarding religious practice, the Establishment Clause (“Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion”), and the Free Exercise clause (“or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof”). Recent Supreme Court rulings regarding violations of these constitutional 
guarantees have identified five principles or tests by which state action may be found to have 
violated the Constitution. These are the three part “Lemon test,” set down by Chief Justice 
Warren Burger in the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman in 1971, and refinements of the third element 
of the Lemon test in Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) and Lee v. Weisman (1992).2   
 The Lemon test specifies that in order to meet Constitutional requirements, government 
action must 1) have a secular purpose; 2) not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting 
religion; and 3) not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. In the 1984 Lynch 
case, Sandra Day O’Connor posed the “entanglement” principle as a matter of “government 
endorsement or disapproval of religion,” so that a state agency would be in violation of the 
Constitution if their action “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are 
insiders, favored members of the political community” (Lynch v. Donnelly 1984:16). The 
Supreme Court’s ruling in the Lee case developed a supplementary test to O’Connor’s 
endorsement rule, that the government “may not coerce anyone to support or participate in 
religion or its exercise” (Lee v. Weisman 1992:6).   
 The Eklund plaintiffs argued in District court that although the state of California is 
justified in teaching students about the basics of Islamic religion and culture, role-playing games 
are an improper way of doing so, because the Islam simulation asked students “to role-play or 
perform activities that were roughly analogous to each pillar [of Islam+” (Eklund v. Byron 
2003:8), and that these activities “taken as a whole, constitute the practice of Islam” (Eklund v. 
Byron 2003:11). Seventh graders, the plaintiffs argued, “could reasonably have believed they 
were practicing the Islam [sic] religion, even if in fact they were not, and the students could also 
have believed that their grade in the class would be based on their willingness to believe the 
tenets of Islam” (Eklund v. Byron 2003:14). In addition, they claimed that certain elements of 
the Islam simulation included the presentation of Islamic beliefs as matters of historical fact, 
and that the teacher of Chase’s class, (non-Muslim) Brooke Carlin, instructed students to write 
essays supportive of Islam. 
 District Court judge Phyllis Hamilton ruled, on the contrary, that neither the facts of the 
case nor the precedents and principles of law developed over the last thirty years lent support 
to the plaintiffs’ claims. Carlin had not referred to students by their Arabic names, although the 
students sometimes used the names in a joking manner outside class. When giving students 
their instructions, she had “specifically emphasized that the module was merely a role-playing 
game and that the students would not actually become Muslims through their participation in 
the module” (Eklund v. Byron 2003:3), a point confirmed by students in other sections of the 
class and not denied by Chase Eklund. When distributing wisdom and quiz cards bearing 
statements like “The Holy Qur’an is God’s word as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad,” she 
had explained that these were Muslim beliefs rather than historical fact. And Chase himself had 
done  previous role-playing simulations, including a mock Senate in U.S. history and one on 
medieval Europe in which he dressed as a priest (he had declined to dress in Muslim garb for 
the Islam simulation). He remembered dressing as a priest, but did not associate it with religion: 
“That doesn’t have anything really to do with God or anything or anybody that you look up to” 
(Eklund v. Byron 2003:6).  He did not believe he had become a senator or a priest through 
participation in these exercises. 
 Hamilton’s legal analysis of the possible Establishment clause violation centered largely 
on the extent to which the role-playing activities during the Oasis Days might have been 
religious, given that “students were asked to role-play or perform activities that were roughly 
analogous to each pillar *of Islam+” (Eklund v. Byron 2003:10). Whether these activities are 
impermissible depends both on whether students felt compelled to participate, and on “an 
objective review of whether the students were actually practicing a religion” (Eklund v. Byron 
2003:11). The defendants argued, the plaintiffs’ experts admitted, and the judge agreed that 
the students had not performed the actual five pillars of faith in their class, and that while their 
activities may have been analogies or “approximations” of Islamic behavior, they were not 
“actually the Islamic religious rites. . . . *and that+ Role-playing activities which are not in 
actuality the practice of a religion do not violate the Establishment Clause” (Eklund v. Byron 
2003:12-13).   
 This finding applies even when simulations resemble religious rituals far more closely 
than did those in Islam: a Simulation. As the California School Boards Association argued in an 
brief to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the appeal of Eklund, the court had previously 
found in the 1992 case of Brown v. Woodland (see below) that 
 
  Some student participatory activity involving school-sponsored ritual may be 
permissible even under [the Establishment Clause] where the activity is used for secular 
pedagogical purposes. For example, having children act out a ceremonial American 
Indian dance for the purpose of exploring and learning about American Indian culture 
may be permissible even if the dance was religious ritual. Similarly, a reenactment of the 
Last Supper or a Passover dinner might be permissible if presented for historical or 
cultural purposes (CSBA 2002:11).   
 
What mattered were the intent element of the Lemon test, the context in which such rituals 
were performed, and the attitude of students. In both the Brown and Eklund cases, the line was 
drawn between “genuine” ritual, on the one hand, and activities that teach “in an engaging 
manner,” but “did not occur in a sacred or worshipful manner” (CSBA 2002:11), and were 
without “devotional or religious intent,” or with a “subjective lack of spiritual intent” (Eklund v 
Byron 2003:13), on the other. Since “the students subjectively understood the distinction 
between the simulation and their actual religious faith,” (Eklund v Byron 2003:15), there was no 
Constitutional violation.  
 
 
 
 
Worshipful Attitudes 
 
But learn, at least, your inability to believe, since reason brings you to it, and yet you 
cannot believe; try then to convince yourself, not by the augmentation of proofs of the 
existence of God, but by the diminution of your own passions. . . . [L]earn from those 
who have been bound like yourself. . .these know the road that you wish to follow. . . 
.Follow their course, then, from its beginning; it consisted in doing all things as if they 
believed in them, in using holy water, in having masses said, etc. Naturally this will make 
you believe and stupefy you at the same time (from Blaise Pascal, The Wager, emphasis 
added). 
 
 
The issue of worshipful attitude in the Eklund decisions specifies the courts’ understanding of 
ritual. True ritual practice, as opposed to simulation, is practice engaged in with a particular set 
of mental dispositions (focus, sobriety) and emotional states (humility, love, fear). In “real” 
Islamic prayer, of course, as in other traditions (Garrett 1997), intention is a vital element of 
making prayer valid and effective as a means of communicating with God. This approach to 
ritual assumes that proper intention and worshipful attitude not only accompany but precede 
ritual performance. One enters the performance of ritual once a decision to do so has been 
made, and the mental state of the worshiper has been adjusted or prepared to provide the 
internal context for a performance which is then serious or sincere. There are other ways to 
think about these connections, though. Durkheim’s discussion of rituals as activities “which 
take rise in the midst of. . .assembled groups and which are destined to excite, maintain, or 
recreate the mental states in these groups” (Durkheim 1965:22) is the most obvious theoretical 
sanction for Pascal’s practical observation that ritual can nurture worshipful mental states 
rather than result from them. As Saba Mahmood (2004) and Charles Hirschkind (2006) have 
shown, there are substantial movements in Egypt and elsewhere which conceptualize ritual 
practice as means for cultivating proper attitudes and mental and emotional states.   
 This understanding of the connection between ritual and belief is of long standing. In 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries nonconformist activists and Anglican clergy in England 
debated the twin issues of public liturgical activity and the ethical status of theater. Both parties 
argued, for different purposes, that the mimicry or enactment of roles which did not match the 
actor’s internal state could effectively transform that state. Critics of the theater argued that 
acting was dangerous to performers and audiences because such temporary hypocrisy could 
collapse the gap between an enactment on stage and the performer’s own personality, 
transforming the performer’s inner state by bringing it into concert with what it was mimicking.  
Churchmen used the same theory of influence to argue that private devotion and prayer were 
insufficient for personal transformation. True piety required not only private prayer but public 
enactment of standard liturgical forms so that the inner state of worshipers would be brought 
into concert with the rest of the congregation (Targoff 1997).  
 The United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment has not followed this logic. For the first several decades of its dealing with religion 
cases, beginning with Reynolds v. United States in 1879 (a case restricting Mormon polygamy), 
the Court solved the problem of free exercise simply by distinguishing between religious belief, 
which was constitutionally protected, and religious action, which could be regulated by statute. 
The Court implicitly endorsed a Protestant valuation of belief over ritual (Sullivan 1994, 2005; 
see Smith 1956 [1889]:16) in which the former was both the necessary core and sufficient 
expression of religion. While beliefs could not necessarily justify otherwise illegal activity, 
particular kinds of belief were necessary to qualify actions as religious. The Reynolds case was 
cited, for example, by a Texas court ruling in 1903, that local restrictions on alcohol 
consumption could be enforced against Jews but not Roman Catholics. In the view of the court, 
in Jewish tradition alcohol was not a sacrament. Even though its use was required at some 
points in the ritual calendar, the court wrote, “Such use of wine has no symbolical or mystical 
meaning, and is in no sense for sacramental purposes, but is used on such occasions as a 
beverage” (quoted in Cookson 2001:11). Action sanctioned by tradition but not derived from an 
explicit theological imperative did not count as ritual, because, implicit in the court’s logic, 
legitimate ritual is an expression of preexisting dogma. 
The concerns expressed by some parents and pundits with regard to Islam: a Simulation 
play on a very different understanding of the connection between ritual and belief. In a broader 
cultural context, parental fears of Islamic ritual are not merely the result of a tense world 
situation and a perceived clash of civilizations symbolized most powerfully by the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th, 2001.3 Those concerns emerge also from two other assumptions 
about religious life. Many parents do not merely assume, with the courts, that beliefs generate 
ritual action, and that ritual action is meaningful only as an expression of belief. Instead, they 
perceive both speech and ritual as activities with transformative psychological or spiritual 
effects. Ritual is not merely the enactment of belief, but can be belief’s gateway.   
Related to this implicit theoretical stance is a widespread substantive set of popular 
American beliefs about intercourse with demonic forces, and specifically the belief that Islam 
has a demonic origin. A recent survey by the Council for American Islamic Relations reports that 
as many as 10% of Americans believe Muslims are pagans who worship a moon god or 
goddess,4 a belief energetically disseminated by some Christian activists. In February 2007, for 
example, a social studies teacher at Enloe High School in Raleigh, North Carolina, invited a 
speaker from Kamil International Ministries to his 9th grade social studies class. Kamil Solomon, 
an Egyptian-born Christian evangelist, distributed pamphlets to students (including at least one 
Muslim girl) that called the prophet Muhammad “demon possessed” and “inspired by Satan,” 
and said that his “militant commands and pagan beliefs are contained in the Koran,” which is 
“the book of Islam that Muhammad claimed was revealed to him by Allah, the moon god of 
Arabs” (Shimron 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; for the text of the handouts, see http://kimo4jesus.org). 
In Rockland County, New York, in April 2007 a Christian prison chaplain was disciplined for 
distributing similar literature–a Chick Publications religious tract calling Allah an idol--to 
inmates. The tracts led to arguments and “to inmates labeling Muslim detainees devil 
worshipers” (Clarke 2007). Far from being a fellow, if troubling, monotheism, Islam is portrayed 
as a heathen belief with Satanic roots. 
Folklorist Bill Ellis (2000, 2004) and others have shown that as rumor panics about 
witchcraft and Satanic ritual abuse spread across the United States during the 1970s and 1980s 
through churches and professional networks of police, therapists, child welfare specialists, and 
the mass media, one pervasive theme was the ease with which children and teenagers could be 
unwittingly drawn into demonic activity. Occult books, not to mention idle experimentation 
with seemingly harmless witchcraft or New Age rituals such as the ubiquitous Ouija Board,5 
could easily entrap young people and render them helpless to resist Satanism. Even some law 
enforcement officers charged with investigating occult rumors came to believe that the 
“intense study of resource books and materials by occult sources or practitioners is hazardous. . 
.The unknown realm of the occult beckons with many lures.  Study and/or experimentation are 
to be avoided” (quoted in Ellis 2004:48-49).  Other evangelical Christian groups talk about 
powerful religious language being “ingested” by worshipers, or even “impregnating” them 
(Coleman 2000:118, 171), both metaphors for processes that are initiated by acts of will, but 
which then proceed outside the control of volition to assimilate into or transform the 
individual’s substance.  This necessitates that the believer take great care of the sorts of 
language, music, and imagery to which he exposes himself, lest he open himself to spiritual 
corruption. 
 The connection between the Eklund case and concerns about the occult was highlighted 
when presiding judge Phyllis Hamilton cited a similar case from a decade earlier. The case of  
Brown v Woodland (1992) centered on parental objections to a children’s literature series 
called Impressions, used in California elementary schools. Parents Katherine and Douglas Brown 
argued that the Impressions series contained more than three dozen (out of several thousand) 
selections from literature describing witchcraft and magical practices and therefore had the 
effect of “endors*ing+ and sponsor*ing+ the religions of Witchcraft and or Neo-Paganism in 
violation of federal and state constitutional separation of church and state principles” (Brown v 
Woodland:1). The California School Boards Association, in its amicus brief for the Eklund appeal, 
cited Brown v Woodland in addition to another case regarding the Impressions series, 
Fleischfresser v Directors of School District 200 (1994), from the US Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Illinois. 
 The Brown and Fleischfresser cases both involved the issue of role-play, in this case, 
lesson plans encouraging children “to prepare and cast chants and spells and to practice being 
witches” (plaintiffs quoted in Fleischfresser 1994:3) as part of their engagement with stories 
about the supernatural. The plaintiffs in Brown argued that such activities “convert neutral 
reading into sponsorship and promotion of the practice and belief systems of Witchcraft and 
Neo-Paganism” (Brown v Woodland 1992:11). While both courts agreed that witchcraft and 
neo-paganism could be considered religious practices, they rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments in 
part because the intent of the exercises was secular (a point to which we will return), the effect 
of the exercises would have been negligible in the context of the entire curriculum, even from 
the standpoint of an impressionable child, and because elements of witchcraft and neo-
paganism are so much part of American popular culture that their use in a literature curriculum 
did not represent excessive state entanglement with religion.   
 As Benjamin Soares (2005) has shown in the case of Mali, and John Bowen (1993) in 
Indonesia, it is precisely the widespread nature of such pagan practices and ideas that prove 
most troublesome to pious activists living in states which are officially “secular” but which 
cannot avoid involvement in religious life. In the context of the broad availability of 
communications media, such activists can use their skills and energy to express the concerns of 
ordinary people who face challenges to their beliefs and values in the public sphere (Soares 
2005). In the American context, the use of the Impressions literature series was upheld despite 
ritual elements that the court admitted could be part of some religious tradition somewhere, 
perhaps even the identifiably real but minority religions of witchcraft or neo-paganism. But 
merely because governmental activity “happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of 
some or all religions,” (a finding from Harris v. McRae in 1980, quoted in Brown v 
Woodland:11), this does not automatically result in an Establishment Clause violation. The 
courts ruled that the secular intent of Impressions rested not only on its reflection of the 
cultural diversity of North American society (Brown v Woodland:16) and its teaching of the 
value of tolerance (Fleischfresser v Directors:8) by encompassing many cultural traditions, but 
especially through its uses of enchantment.   
 According to the court, this enchantment is not the literal phenomenon of Christian 
parental fears--an entrapment into occultism and damnation--but a mind-broadening door into 
modern consciousness through an intense but temporary engagement that results in the 
development of creativity, imagination and psychological flexibility. 
 
[The literature series] invokes mystery and imagination associated with folklore to 
promote learning. . . .Religions also invoke mystery and imagination for their own 
special purposes.  However, the convergence of religious themes with the outcroppings 
of mystery and imagination contained in Impressions does not afford a constitutional 
basis for circumscribing the teaching tools available to educators (Brown v 
Woodland:17). 
 
Judges on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Illinois elaborated on this point: 
 
*T+his ‘religion’ that is allegedly being established seems for all the world like a collection 
of exercises in “make-believe” designed to develop and encourage the use of 
imagination and reading skills in children. . .The purpose of the series, stated by the 
publisher. . .is that the inclusion of a variety of stories serves to stimulate a child’s 
senses, imagination, intellect, and emotions; according to the publisher, this is the best 
way to build reading skills. This reading series includes works of C.S. Lewis, A.A. Milne, 
Dr. Seuss, Ray Bradbury, L. Frank Baum, Maurice Sendak and other noted authors of 
fiction. Further, these works, and so many others that are part of any elementary 
classroom experience have one important characteristic in common; they all involve 
fantasy and make-believe to a significant degree. The parents would have us believe 
that the inclusion of these works in an elementary school curriculum represents the 
impermissible establishment of pagan religion. We do not agree. After all, what would 
become of elementary education. . .without works such as these and scores. . .of others 
that serve to expand the minds of young children and develop their sense of creativity? 
With that off our chest, we can now properly dispose of the parents’ claim within the 
structure of the Lemon test (Fleischfresser v Directors:6). 
 
Fantasy and make-believe, according to this extra-legal aside, are “skills. . .fundamental to 
children of this age, and it is critical that the [schools] select the best tools available to them to 
teach these skills” (Fleischfresser v Directors:8). It is possible to read these cases as translations 
into legal idioms of different interpretations of the spiritual and psychological power of ritual, 
rather than merely as adjudications of the abstract principal of state sponsorship. The court’s 
evaluation differs from that of the parents in that it sees enchantment as a path to the 
development of a flexible consciousness, while parents see it as linked, always, with a specific 
content that both narrows and misleads. 
 
Magical Thinking and Modernity 
 
That children in the United States are expected to learn the skills of fantasy and make-believe 
as a matter of course, while the children of Manus (Mead 1932) and other “traditional” cultures 
might not, is one of the key features of the idea of modernity.  If the category of “stranger” 
disrupts the ordering power of the nation-state’s fundamental opposition between friend and 
enemy (Bauman 1990), it is the undecidability of the stranger’s intentions, rather than lack of 
knowledge about his beliefs, that proves most perplexing.  “The commitment the stranger 
declares cannot be trusted” (Bauman 1990:150) precisely because one’s imagination has been 
primed to appreciate his difference. Half a century ago, sociologist Daniel Lerner, in his classic 
articulation of modernization theory, The Passing of Traditional Society, wrote that 
  
The model of behavior developed by modern society is characterized by empathy, a high 
capacity for rearranging the self-system on short notice. . .[T]he interdependent sectors 
of modern society require widespread participation. This in turn requires an expansive 
and adaptive self-system, ready to incorporate new roles and to identify personal values 
with public issues. This is why modernization of any society has involved the great 
characterological transformation we call psychic mobility (Lerner 1958:51). 
 
Empathy, the ability to imagine oneself in another’s place, is a central psychological feature in 
this reading of modernity, as it allows the modern personality to imagine and accomplish self-
directed change and to predict, appreciate, and use the perceptions, understandings, and goals 
of others. Classroom simulations try to develop this sort of understanding in a more or less 
literal way through the temporary, restricted and shallow reenactment of other lifeways. The 
goal, for Lerner, was a psychic flexibility that would allow personal change and transformation 
within the context of social and economic development. For contemporary educators, the goal 
is both socioeconomic and moral: to encourage an understanding of cultural diversity and 
promote tolerance in the context of an irreducibly multicultural society and encompassing 
“global village.”    
 But as literature scholar Stephen Greenblatt notes in an argument about the way this 
mobile personality served the European colonial project that began in the sixteenth century, 
“What is essential” in this Western sense of empathy 
 
is the Europeans' ability again and again to insinuate themselves into the 
preexisting political, religious, even psychic structures of the natives and to turn 
those structures to their advantage. . . .There are periods and cultures in which 
the ability to insert oneself into the consciousness of another is of relatively 
slight importance,. . .others in which it is a major preoccupation, the object of 
cultivation and fear. Professor Lerner is right to insist that this ability is a 
characteristically (though not exclusively) Western mode. . .he misleads only in 
insisting. . .that it is an act of imaginative generosity, a sympathetic appreciation 
of the situation of the other fellow. . . .[W]e must understand that he is speaking 
of the exercise of. . . power, power that is creative as well as destructive, but 
that is scarcely ever wholly disinterested or benign (Greenblatt 1980:227-228). 
 
Such power depends on "the ability and willingness to play a role, to transform oneself, if only 
for a brief period and with mental reservations, into another. This necessitates the acceptance 
of disguise, the ability to effect a divorce. . . between the tongue and the heart. Such role-
playing in turn depends upon the transformation of another's reality into a manipulable fiction" 
(Greenblatt 1980:228), the use of make-believe “as foundation of an all-too-seriously serious 
reality,” which Taussig (1993:255) sees as a fundamental element of human experience central 
to the process of creating cultural “others.” Recent proposals by U.S. government agencies, 
consultants, and private organizations to respond to the threat of globalized radical Islam 
through a public diplomacy offensive, seeking to encourage particular forms of Islamic thought 
and practice (Kaplan 2005, Mahmood 2006, Benard 2004, Rabasa and Benard 2007), derive in 
part from a confidence that we can rearrange the theology and devotional practices of others 
by imagining and supporting alternative Islams, often Islams developed by thinkers whose own 
psychic flexibility derives from modern forms of education and match our own or that of our 
modernist ancestors (Starrett 2008). 
 In Eklund v. Byron, the “other’s” reality is Islam, and its manipulability as fiction is 
simultaneously the goal of one non-Muslim party and the fear of the other. From the 
perspective of contemporary evangelical culture, Islam as a demonic and proselytizing reality 
cannot be manipulated, even in fictional form, without spiritual danger. Anyone encouraging 
such practice in the classroom is a de facto ally of Islamist radicals, a popular reaction that led 
one schoolteacher involved in a controversy over teaching about Islam to remark ruefully that 
in the public consciousness he had been suddenly transformed from “a Methodist boy from the 
deserts of California. . .into a pro-Muslim fundamentalist multiculturalist activist” (personal 
communication, 28 February 2007).   
 Added to this cultural concern is the more strictly legal question of the boundaries and 
uses of ritual in secular contexts. Is an analog to ritual action ritual itself? Is it part of a 
devotional and therefore illegitimate ritual whose aim is “learning Islam,” or part of a secular 
and therefore legitimate schoolroom ritual whose aim is “learning about Islam”? And does it 
make a difference in our multicultural society precisely whom the targets of these exercises 
are? Can a Muslim student be expected to simulate “her own culture” in the context of 
schoolroom lessons? The Council on Islamic Education, one of the allegedly “militant Islamic 
groups” Daniel Pipes has accused of pressuring textbook publishers and school districts to use 
their power to indoctrinate children in Islam, has itself criticized the use of role-playing 
exercises in public schools (see www.cie.org). The CIE advances two main reasons for 
cautioning against such exercises, both drawn from guidelines developed by a nonprofit 
organization called The First Amendment Center and endorsed by almost twenty American 
religious and educational groups (Haynes 1999). First, according to CIE, 
 
 Simulating acts of worship or mimicking the language of beliefs and personal identity 
can trivialize deeply held ideas and spiritual experiences. It is not necessary to inhabit 
another’s religious beliefs in order to learn about differing belief patterns. . . .Second, 
such role-playing activities simulate conforming to a particular religion by following 
some or all of its practices. As such, these activities violate. . .the principles that study of 
religion must be academic and not devotional, that teaching about religion must not 
seek to conform students to a religion, and that the teaching neither denigrates or 
promotes any religions or religion per se. . . .To see how inappropriate such role-playing 
activities are, one need only ponder the possibility that a student who practices the 
religion in question is present in the class.  How could they perform the “simulation”? 
(www.cie.org) 
 
 Such simulations are deployed more often than we might think, though, as Muslim 
Student Associations sponsor Ramadan “Fast-a-Thons” on college campuses, raising 
consciousness and resources by having non-Muslim students sign up to fast for a day during 
Ramadan in return for community or corporate donations of food or money to local charities 
(600 students signed up for the 2006 Fast-a-Thon at Indiana University in Bloomington, and 30 
at Texas State University in San Marcos). On a number of college and even high school 
campuses, non-Muslim women–with the encouragement of local Muslim organizations and 
individuals as well as their non-Muslim social studies teachers–have donned hijab, or modest 
dress, for short periods of time to investigate the everyday discrimination, anxiety and hostility 
veiled women attract in the United States. The objectified form of exotic ritual has multiple 
uses.   
 
Conclusions 
 
Social conflict is not something that happens when, out of weakness, indefiniteness, 
obsolescence, or neglect, cultural forms cease to operate, but rather something which 
happens when, like burlesqued winks, such forms are pressed by unusual situations or 
unusual intentions to operate in unusual ways (Geertz 1973:28). 
 
 The Center for Islamic Education’s concerns about burlesqued winks at Islam are 
matched by the concerns of some Christian activists about those same winks as rehearsal. At 
least three theories of ritual action are at stake in Eklund and related cases. In the first, ritual is 
a coercive tool to distance children from their parents’ religious heritage. As noted above, for 
some Protestants this theory is informed by a theological conception of demon-inspired writing 
and ritual which draws people into intercourse with dark spirits and entraps them. The Center 
for Islamic Education and others like the lawyers of the Thomas More Law Center and the 
American Catholic Lawyer’s Association may be informed by a less suspicious but more 
widespread view of ritual as a central element of specific religious traditions that helps bind the 
congregant to the past, the present, and the future community of worship. Engaging in the 
rituals of a tradition to which one does not acknowledge membership or commitment is 
evidence of inauthenticity and must be the result of misunderstanding, coercion, hypocrisy, or 
evil intent.   
 The third theory of ritual is that of teachers and the courts, for whom some limited 
types of coercion–and even the performance of rituals acknowledged as sacred to particular 
traditions, as long at they are approached with “secular” intent--are legitimate for the sake of 
learning, a particular kind of psychological transformation which is assumed not to affect the 
student’s relationship to family social identities or spiritual loyalties. Ritual and ritual-like action 
are legally troublesome only if approached with a particular set of cognitive or emotional 
orientations. But much of the contemporary anthropology of ritual takes a different view.  
Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) have argued, like Robertson Smith (1956[1889]) and Rappaport 
(1983), that action belonging to the abstract category of “ritual” is independent of the 
intentions or understandings of its participants, and that engagement in ritualized action is a 
kind of “performative thinking” that demonstrates a particular kind of commitment to, or even 
the creation of, entities outside the self (Houseman 2005). To expand on this analysis, it is 
worth pointing out that these entities might be anything: an idea, a person, a deity, an 
institution, a kinship group, a tradition, a social relationship.   
 From this perspective, the difference between ritual and the “simulation” of ritual 
becomes clearer. If ritual is a culturally meaningful act in Geertz’s sense (even if not defined by 
the mental state or intention of any particular actor), then its simulation is not a meaningless 
act, but rather an act which is meaningful relative to a different set of entities, entities 
potentially unspecified in the ritual’s own manifest content. In this case, the enactment is 
relative to the values of tolerance, cosmopolitanism, and diversity, or to the very modernist 
attitude that Lerner attributed to developed societies. In a more specific sense, these are rituals 
not of Islam, but rituals relative to Islam as a member of the category of “world religions” 
rather than merely the national religion of the Arabs (Masuzawa 2005) or one of the “unusual 
religions or religious practices” that the California Department of Education feared might 
undermine respect for religion as such (CSBA 2002:21). Schoolroom rituals are also meaningful 
relative to traditions of pedagogy charged with developing imagination and creativity “for their 
own sake” as taken-for-granted elements of psychological well-being. And finally, they are 
practical responses to the difficulty of teaching history to middle grades students, whose 
teachers assume that the participatory nature of dramatic or ritual enactments holds their 
attention long enough to slide “secular” information into their brains. Like other daily rituals, 
they help define the relationship between student and teacher. 
 In thinking through “the dark side of globalization” Appadurai noted that one of the 
many uncertainties common in the modern world “is about whether a particular person really is 
what he or she claims or appears to be or has historically been. . . .[L]ocal and regional forms of 
cultural fundamentalism may be seen as part of an emerging repertoire of efforts to produce 
previously unrequired levels of certainty about social identity [and] values” (2006:6-7; see also 
Bauman 1990, 1991).   Absent or much attenuated in such fundamentalisms–whether religious 
or secular--is the ability to contextualize public representations of identity in complex or 
nuanced ways. Absent also is an appreciation that the depth of one’s discomfort with the 
identities of Others might be more severe the closer they are to one’s own (Harrison 2002). 
While Appadurai’s analytical framework attaches the adjective “predatory” to majority 
populations seeking to halt the growth and influence of minorities, anti-Muslim activists in the 
United States attach it to the phenomenon of Muslim civil and legal engagement (Goldstein 
2008).   
 For Geertz, the chief difficulty in understanding people of other cultures is “a lack of 
familiarity with the imaginative universes within which their acts are signs” (1973:13). Like 
Lerner, he thinks of the modern consciousness as one in which a flexible generosity of spirit 
prompts us to seek a morally engaged conversation with others aimed at “the enlargement of 
the universe of human discourse” (1973:14). Greenblatt and Taussig might reply that the issue 
of cultural gulfs is partly a matter of the different degrees of power people have to choose 
which imaginative universe is to be the framework in which given actions are to be 
interpreted.6 Unlike non-Muslim projects to reform Islam, schoolroom simulations and Muslim 
“ritual outreach” activities like Fast-A-Thons evoke imaginative universes of religious ritual, but 
do so with properly court-sanctioned secular intent, seeking neither to represent nor to create 
“sacred and worshipful” orientations. They may even act as buffers between the 
understandings and interests of Muslims and non-Muslims, preventing either from engaging 
too directly or explicitly with assumptions and experiences underpinning the imaginative 
universes of the other.   
 Ritual simulation, being something that anyone might do, interferes with the certainty 
about identity Appadurai and Bauman identify as one of the urgent desires of a modern, mobile 
world. For some communities concerned about the politics of Islam, the experience of 
modernity is one in which it is possible to believe that their governing agencies and educational 
institutions are collaborating with Muslim minorities to convert children to Islam in the interest 
of “secularism,” “tolerance,” or “multiculturalism.” As the twenty-first century proceeds, we 
can hope that these experiences and these perceptions of an insidious politics of enchantment 
do not result in the development of further predatory identities. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1“It is above all the media said. Some of them said that in Holland, at one of the centers, the 
number of people who accepted Islam during the days that followed the [September 11] 
operations were more than the people who accepted Islam in the last eleven years.” Osama bin 
Laden, from transcript at  http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/12/13/tape.transcript/ 
2Lemon v. Kurtzman concerned the constitutionality of providing state funds and services to 
students and employees of parochial schools; Lynch v. Donnelly centered on the issue of 
whether municipalities could display publicly funded religious symbols as part of holiday 
displays. 
 
3 Several times since that date, Muslims praying in public areas such as malls or airports in the 
U.S. have triggered reports to local or federal authorities of suspicious activity, the assumption 
being that would-be martyrs pray before conducting suicide attacks. 
4  See, for example, http://www.biblebelievers.org.au/moongod.htm, and 
http://www.chick.com/information/religions/islam/allah2.asp. 
 
5 The Ouija Board (implicated in the demonic possession in William Friedkin’s 1973 film The 
Exorcist), is a divination game in which two players place their fingers on a flat marker which 
moves across a board printed with the letters of the alphabet. Participants ask the board 
questions, and the spelled-out answers are taken to be the work of spiritual forces. For more 
details, see Ellis 2000. 
6  Misconstrual may be a tactical decision, as when pundits at Pipes’ website Campus Watch 
and related publications launched an effort in November 2006 to discredit University of 
Pennsylvania president Amy Gutmann by posting noisy denunciations of her actions at an 
annual Halloween party at her official residence. Like the parents of the trick-or-treater dressed 
as Osama bin Laden, Gutmann was criticized as unpatriotic and morally insensitive for having 
posed for photographs with a number of  students dressed in costume, one of whom, an 
engineering student of Middle Eastern heritage, was dressed as a Muslim “martyr” complete 
with replica rifle and suicide belt (http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/2941). 
